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Rethinking	the	governance	of	economic	and	monetary
union:	Should	rules	continue	to	rule?
Although	the	EU	economy	has	returned	to	a	period	of	stable	growth	since	the	Eurozone	crisis,	several
key	issues	in	the	governance	of	economic	and	monetary	union	remain	unresolved.	Drawing	on	results
from	the	Firstrun	project,	Iain	Begg	provides	an	overview	of	current	concerns	and	outlines	five
recommendations	to	help	further	the	debate.
The	turbulent	times	of	the	last	decade	have	prompted	a	wide-ranging	reassessment	of	the	architecture,
principles	and	governance	of	economic	and	monetary	union	(EMU).	Although	the	EU	economy	is	showing	welcome
signs	of	returning	to	more	stable	growth	and	there	is	a	consensus	that	the	reforms	to	date	have	ushered-in	a	more
robust	and	resilient	framework,	many	key	issues	remain	to	be	resolved.	In	particular,	shortcomings	in	the	hitherto
dominant	rules-based	approach	have	prompted	a	search	for	new	solutions.	Among	the	concerns	are:
The	continuing	bias	towards	pro-cyclicality	of	the	rules
The	absence	of	incentives	for	tighter	fiscal	policies	in	good	times,	capable	of	building	buffers	against	future
downturns
The	lack	of	emphasis	on	public	investment
The	definition	and	application	of	escape	clauses.	These	are	both	necessary	to	provide	flexibility,	yet	often
susceptible	to	manipulation	by	governments	and	even	the	possibility	of	governments	shifting	the	blame	to	the
EU	level	for	unpopular,	though	economically	sound,	policies.
This	article	summarises	some	of	the	principal	messages	from	a	longer	policy	report,	itself	an	overview	of	policy-
relevant	findings	from	several	of	the	contributors	to	the	Firstrun	project.	It	focuses	on	three	main	themes:	fiscal	and
other	macroeconomic	policy	rules;	the	scope	for	Fiscal	Councils	to	enhance	governance	and	the	ensuing	risks;	and
the	imperative	of	achieving	better	legitimation	of	the	processes	and	mechanisms.
Key	messages	on	rules
Much	of	the	academic	interest	in	rules	has	been	on	their	design	and	the	importance	of	well-aligned	incentives,	but	a
broad	consensus	is	that	the	EU	system	of	fiscal	rules	has	become	too	complicated	and	that	they	are	too	prone	to
lead	to	inappropriate	policy	prescriptions.	Doubts	have	grown	about	the	economics	behind	rules,	not	least	where
they	have	led	to	fiscal	policy	tighter	than	was	warranted	at	a	time	of	enduring	stagnation.	More	specifically:
Despite	efforts	to	refine	rules	and	to	extend	their	reach,	notably	to	include	sources	of	imbalance	other	than
public	finances,	they	are	dogged	by	shortcomings	in	compliance.
The	success	of	fiscal	rules	is	open	to	doubt.	Although	headline	deficit	indicators	have	improved	markedly,
public	debts	have	not.	However,	it	may	be	that	rules	deter	governments	from	exceeding	target	thresholds	by	as
much	as	they	might	otherwise	do.
Commission	scrutiny	of	ex-ante	compliance	with	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	in	national	budgets	reveals	a
persistent	risk	of	non-compliance	by	a	number	of	Member	States.
In	the	early-warning	stage	of	the	macroeconomic	imbalances	procedure	(MIP),	insufficient	account	is	taken	of
the	heterogeneity	of	national	circumstances.	The	policy	implication	is	that	the	process	could	be	made	more
effective	by	selecting	indicators	best-suited	to	capture	specific	national	risks.
A	more	fundamental	question	is	whether	the	whole	MIP	process	can	be	made	more	relevant	to	national	policy-
making.	If	not,	it	is	open	to	the	charge	of	irrelevance	and	an	implication	is	it	might	as	well	be	discontinued.
The	project’s	findings	raise	concerns	about	the	political	economy	factors	affecting	the	implementation	of	rules,
as	opposed	to	their	design.	Evidence	from	Firstrun	case	studies	suggests	a	more	insidious	political	economy
dimension	to	these	concerns,	namely	the	perception	that	enforcement	is	avoided	when	it	becomes	politically
inconvenient.
The	policy	implication	is	that,	although	rules	are	potentially	useful	where	governments	struggle	to	adopt	time-
consistent	policies,	their	effectiveness	depends	on	the	quality	of	implementation.
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Rules	will	undoubtedly	continue	to	be	part	of	the	EU	economic	governance	framework,	but	an	over-arching	message
from	this	report	and,	more	generally,	from	the	Firstrun	project	is	that	reliance	on	them	will	not	be	enough	to
guarantee	sustainable	public	finances,	let	alone	macroeconomic	stability.	Other	implications	include:
Where	rules	and	other	facets	of	governance	risk	accentuating	not	just	economic	problems,	but	have	adverse
social	consequences,	they	should	be	revisited,	irrespective	of	the	aggregate	macroeconomic	arguments.
Debt	rules	in	particular	should	be	reconsidered,	because	they	too	readily	neglect	the	asset	side	of	the	public
balance	sheet,	militating	against	the	kinds	of	public	investment	that	might	be	used	to	restore	underlying	growth
performance.
Given	that	private	risk	sharing	can	play	a	significant	role	in	attenuating	asymmetric	shocks,	the	balance
between	the	market	and	governments	in	the	governance	of	the	euro	may	need	to	be	both	recast	and	better
regulated.
Key	messages	on	Fiscal	Councils
Among	recent	governance	reforms	was	the	expectation	that	independent	Fiscal	Councils	charged	with	monitoring
fiscal	sustainability	would	be	introduced.	Nearly	all	Member	States	now	have	these	bodies	and	there	is	also	now	a
European	Fiscal	Board	which	advises	on,	inter	alia,	the	euro	area	fiscal	stance.	The	role	and	influence	of	Fiscal
Councils	has	been	examined	in	Firstrun	research	from	two	perspectives:	how	they	have	affected	policy-making	and
whether	they	add	to	concerns	about	the	legitimacy	of	governance	developments.	Because,	in	many	cases,	they	have
only	recently	been	established,	assessments	have	to	be	tentative,	but	key	points	include	the	following:
Fiscal	Councils	tend	to	be	more	cautious	than	governments	in	their	assessments	of	fiscal	conditions,	but	their
influence	is	varied,	depending	on	the	national	context.
If	they	prove	to	be	systematically	too	pessimistic,	the	councils’	credibility	may	be	undermined	–	what	might	be
called	the	‘crying	wolf’
How	effectively	Fiscal	Councils	communicate	with	other	stakeholders	varies:	some	have	been	able	rapidly	to
become	prominent	in	national	public	debates,	including	being	solicited	by	the	media,	while	others	struggle	for
oxygen.
This	‘political	relevance’	risk	could	be	compounded	if	governments	are	also	able	to	place	obstacles	in	the	path
of	the	councils,	such	as	by	restricting	access	to	data	or	providing	too	little	time	or	too	few	resources	to	enable
the	council	to	function	effectively.
A	third	worry	is	more	pernicious:	governments	may	actively	seek	to	neutralise	the	council.	In	this	regard,	the
appointments	process	matters:	if	governments	or	the	political	parties	behind	them	are	able	to	pack	the	council
with	members	expected	to	be	less	willing	to	be	critical,	the	benefits	of	independent	scrutiny	will	be	jeopardised.
What	might	be	called	an	‘emasculation’	risk	has	already	been	seen	in	Hungary,	and	Firstrun	case	studies	found
anecdotal	evidence	of	other	councils	in	danger	of	being	compromised	in	this	way.
A	particular	sensitivity	is	how	to	factor	Fiscal	Councils	into	legitimation	and	accountability.
Legitimation	challenges	and	the	fiscal	constitution
The	need	to	reconcile	legitimation	and	effective	governance	has	repeatedly	been	acknowledged	–	not	least	as	one	of
the	four	pillars	of	both	the	Four	and	Five	Presidents	reports,	but	solutions	have	been	difficult	to	find.	The	root
problem	is	to	reconcile	the	desire	for	collective	discipline,	portrayed	as	being	in	the	common	interest,	with	national
autonomy	and	democratic	choice,	so	that:
Seeking	further	to	redesign	or	recalibrate	rules	as	the	cornerstone	of	EMU	reform	is	likely	to	offer	a	false
prospectus.	Instead,	what	is	needed	is	better	definition	of	the	EU’s	fiscal	constitution	and,	within	it,	of	how	the
different	elements	of	public	finances	–	including	the	EU	budget	and	any	new	fiscal	capacities	–	are	brought
together.
Rules	may	still	have	a	place	but	a	more	limited	one	and,	because	of	the	implicit	contract	between	voters	and
tax-payers,	on	one	side,	and	decision-makers	on	the	other,	the	political	dimension	of	fiscal	policy	has	to	be
centre-stage.
Even	if	rules	can	be	well-designed	and	offer	adequate	incentives	to	Member	States,	they	will	struggle	if
enforcement	is	lax.	A	solution	may	be	to	opt	for	national	rules	on	the	grounds	of	‘ownership’:	unless	national
policy-making	systems,	the	decision-makers	central	to	them	and	national	electorates	have	a	stake	in	making
rules	work,	they	are	likely	to	be	ineffectual.
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Recommendations
‘You	cannot	run	a	single	currency	on	the	basis	of	rules	and	statistics	alone.	It	needs	constant	political
assessment,	as	the	basis	of	new	economic,	fiscal	and	social	policy	choices’	–	Jean-Claude	Juncker
Many	contributions	to	the	debate	on	the	future	of	EMU	governance	have	sought	to	find	ways	to	balance	the	sharing
of	risks	and	the	control	of	risks	in	the	policy	framework.	A	recent	example	is	the	‘Saint	Nicholas’	package	of
proposals	from	the	European	Commission	for	a	series	of	initiatives	to	deepen	EMU,	through	assorted	measures	to
improve	the	institutional	mix.	A	further	high	profile	intervention	was	by	the	group	of	fourteen	French	and	German
economists	proposing	a	compromise	approach	aimed	at	bridging	the	long-standing	differences	between	advocates	of
risk	sharing	and	risk	controlling.	Unsurprisingly,	the	latter	has	elicited	conflicting	reactions.
The	following	recommendations,	derived	from	the	Firstrun	findings,	are	put	forward	to	further	the	debate	and	to
emphasise	the	importance	of	reconciling	what	is	economically	desirable	with	what	is	politically	feasible.	Two
underlying	messages	are	that	neglect	of	the	political	economy	dimensions	of	governance	reform	would	be	perilous
and	there	should	be	greater	urgency	in	arriving	at	solutions.
Recommendation	1:	the	proliferation	and	complexity	of	fiscal	rules	should	be	rationalised	with	the	emphasis	placed
on	debt	sustainability	and	on	national	rules.
Recommendation	2:	institutional	relationships	which	are	crucial	to	the	implementation	of	rules	should	be	recast	to
ensure	a	better	balance	between	enforcement,	compliance	and	appropriateness.
Recommendation	3:	recognising	that	the	macroeconomic	imbalances	procedure	is	having	only	a	limited	impact	on
national	policy	choices,	it	may	be	better	to	revert	to	softer	forms	of	coordination,	with	a	greater	emphasis	on	carrots
than	sticks.
Recommendation	4:	Fiscal	Councils	can	become	significant	actors	in	economic	governance,	but	their	role	within	the
governance	framework	has	to	be	better	developed	and	integrated	with	the	surveillance	emanating	from	the	EU	and
international	institutions.	Efforts	have	to	be	made	to	strengthen	the	legitimacy	of	councils.
Recommendation	5:	although	legitimacy	concerns	around	the	evolution	of	governance	have	repeatedly	been
highlighted,	they	have	yet	to	be	adequately	addressed	and	should	be	accorded	higher	priority.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	is	based	on	a	policy	brief	which	draws	results	from	the	Firstrun	project.	It	gives	the	views	of
the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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